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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
Dawn Ball, an inmate in the Restricted Housing Unit 
at the Pennsylvania State Correctional Institution Muncy 
(“SCI-Muncy”), appeals the denial of her motion for a 
preliminary injunction and the grant of summary judgment to 
the defendants in this pro se action she brought pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, in which she alleges deliberate indifference to 
her medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment.  
Because Ball has asked to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) 
on appeal, we must determine whether she is eligible for that 
status under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 
Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996).  For the 
following reasons, we conclude that she is not eligible for IFP 
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status because she had accrued three “strikes” under the 
PLRA and was not in imminent danger of serious physical 
injury when she brought these appeals.  We will therefore 
deny her motion to proceed IFP and will also deny without 
prejudice her motion for appointment of counsel. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
 A.  Statutory Background 
 
The federal IFP statute, enacted in 1892 and currently 
codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1915, “is designed to ensure that 
indigent litigants have meaningful access to the federal 
courts,”  Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989), and 
that “‘no citizen shall be denied an opportunity to commence, 
prosecute, or defend an action, civil or criminal, in any court 
of the United States, solely because ... poverty makes it 
impossible ... to pay or secure the costs’ of litigation.”  
Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992) (alterations in 
original) (quoting Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 
335 U.S. 331, 342 (1948)).  Pertinent here, the statute allows 
“[a] prisoner seeking to bring a civil action or [to] appeal a 
judgment in a civil action” to proceed “without prepayment of 
fees or security therefor,” if she can demonstrate that she is 
unable to pay such fees.  28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2).   
 
Congress recognized, however, that “a litigant whose 
filing fees and court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a 
paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from 
filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.”  Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  And indeed, despite 
efforts to curtail the opportunity for abusive filings that free 
court access can provide, “[p]risoner litigation continues to 
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account for an outsized share of filings in federal district 
courts.”  Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 203 (2007) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  In 1996, in response to the tide of 
“substantively meritless prisoner claims that have swamped 
the federal courts,” Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 117 (3d 
Cir. 2000) (original emphasis omitted), Congress enacted the 
PLRA to “filter out the bad claims and facilitate consideration 
of the good,” Bock, 549 U.S. at 204.   
 
The PLRA sought to “reduce the quantity and improve 
the quality of prisoner suits,” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 
524 (2002), in three main ways.  First, it introduced an 
exhaustion requirement, which bars an action by a prisoner 
complaining of prison conditions “until such administrative 
remedies as are available are exhausted.”  42 U.S.C. 
§ 1997e(a).  Second, it established “prescreening” provisions 
that require a court to dismiss an action or appeal sua sponte 
if the action is “frivolous” or “malicious,” “fails to state a 
claim upon which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary 
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.”  See 
28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (e)(2)(B)(ii), 1915A(b); 42 
U.S.C. § 1997e(c).  Third, it created a so-called “three 
strikes” rule to limit the number of lawsuits brought by 
prisoners with a history of meritless litigation.  Under that 
provision, the language of which tracks that of the 
prescreening provisions, a prisoner seeking IFP status may 
not  
 
bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a 
civil action or proceeding under this section if 
the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, 
while incarcerated or detained in any facility, 
brought an action or appeal in a court of the 
 6 
 
United States that was dismissed on the grounds 
that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a 
claim upon which relief may be granted, unless 
the prisoner is under imminent danger of 
serious physical injury. 
28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).  But “[i]t is important to note that 
§ 1915(g) does not block a prisoner’s access to the federal 
courts.  It only denies the prisoner the privilege of filing 
before he has acquired the necessary filing fee.”  Abdul-Akbar 
v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 314 (3d Cir. 2001) (en banc).
1
 
 
 B.  Facts
2
 
 
Ball is an indigent inmate at SCI-Muncy who suffers 
from a variety of physical and mental ailments.  Among her 
physical afflictions, she has “serious back problems” and 
osteoarthritis (App. at 92, 100), she fears that she is losing her 
vision due to a lack of medical treatment for her eyes, and she 
                                              
1
 The prisoner is still required to pay the costs of her 
action or appeal, a departure from pre-PLRA practice, see 
Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 27 (1992), paying an 
initial partial fee followed by installment payments until the 
entire fee is paid.  28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). 
2
 We set forth the facts in the light most favorable to 
Ball because “th[e] initial assessment of the in forma pauperis 
plaintiff’s factual allegations must be weighted in favor of the 
plaintiff.”  Denton, 504 U.S. at 32.  However, the Supreme 
Court has, in the IFP context, “reject[ed] the notion that a 
court must accept as having an arguable basis in fact all 
allegations that cannot be rebutted by judicially noticeable 
facts.”  Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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is asthmatic.  Also, by her own account, she suffers from 
several mental illnesses that include “PTSD, disassociative 
[sic] disorder, ... phobias, agoraphobia, severe anxiety, ... 
cognitive problems and disorders, ...  paranoid-schizophrenic, 
constant worry, frightened[,] scared, ... bipolar, manic 
depressive, [and] mood swings that are so severe, can’t think 
clearly ... .”  Ball v. SCI Muncy, No. 08-cv-700 (M.D. Pa.) 
(Doc. 216 (“Magistrate Judge’s Report”), pg. 1) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 
Ball’s claims in the present action fall into several 
broad categories.  First, she alleges that she sustained burns, 
bruises, cuts, and contusions at the hands of prison officials, 
and that she was subsequently denied medical attention for 
those injuries.  Second, she complains that Dr. Famiglio 
“allows the prison officials to take her mattress [and] refuse 
her needed meds” (App. at 100), and that prison officials have 
also denied her the use of her wheelchair and cane, 
exacerbating the pain caused by her back problems and 
degenerative joint disease.  Third, Ball alleges that her vision 
is deteriorating due to a lack of proper medical treatment for 
her eyes.  Fourth, she alleges that she is “living in a room 
with dangerous black mold” (App. at 94) and that Dr. 
Famiglio is “continually allowing the prison officials to spray 
her with o/c (mace)” (id. at 100), both of which endanger her 
health because she suffers from chronic asthma.  More 
generally, Ball alleges that prison officials have subjected her 
to mistreatment in retaliation for the many lawsuits she has 
filed against SCI-Muncy and its personnel, and that Dr. 
Famiglio denied her medical treatment because she refused 
his romantic advances.  
 8 
 
 
Appellees deny all of Ball’s allegations, asserting that 
“Ms. Ball ... has no need for such [medical] care,” (App. at 
88) and that she “has available to her emergency medical 
care,”  (id. at 89).  They also state that Ball has been 
described as a “possible malingerer,” that she “feigns 
blindness,” and that she “claims back pain ... and numerous 
other conditions that have not been supported by any 
objective findings or examinations.”  (App. at 88-89.)  They 
also allege that she frequently refuses to leave her cell to see 
medical caregivers.  
 
 C.  Procedural History 
 
  1.  Litigation Prior to the Present Appeals
3
  
 
The present action is part of a larger pattern of 
repeated and entirely unsuccessful litigation brought by Ball 
in the United States District Court for the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania.  We discuss only those actions that are relevant 
to the appeals now before us. 
 
The germane history began in March 2008, with a 
complaint filed against SCI-Muncy in which Ball alleged 
physical assault, denial of medical treatment, and other 
mistreatment.  See Ball v. SCI Muncy, No. 08-cv-0391 (M.D. 
Pa.).  The District Court dismissed that action in December 
2008 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), 
noting that Ball’s failure to exhaust her administrative 
remedies, as required by the PLRA, was stated in her 
                                              
3
 All of Ball’s actions discussed in this opinion were 
filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
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complaint.  See id. (Doc. 36).   We affirmed that dismissal in 
July 2010.  See id. (Doc. 44). 
 
Ball filed a second civil action in May 2009, claiming 
that her constitutional rights were violated because she was 
not allowed to participate by phone in a hearing on a paternity 
matter she had filed in state court.  See Ball v. Hartman, No. 
09-cv-0844, 2010 WL 597401 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 2010).  In 
January 2010, the District Court granted the motion to 
dismiss filed by one of the defendants, observing that “[t]he 
complaint lacks any allegations against [the defendant], who 
is not a prison employee, but rather, a court administrator in 
Northhampton County.”  See Ball v. Hartman, No. 09-cv-
0844, 2010 WL 146319, at *5-*7 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 2010).
4
  
In February 2010, the Court then dismissed the remaining 
claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) on the grounds that the 
defendants were not personally involved in the alleged 
mistreatment and could not be sued in their supervisory 
capacity under § 1983, and that Ball had not pled an injury-
in-fact and therefore lacked standing.  See Hartman, 2010 
WL 597401, at *2-*3.
5
  We affirmed the District Court’s 
                                              
4
 The District Court also explained that, “even if the 
complaint contained factual allegations against [the 
defendant], she would be immune from suit,” Ball v. 
Hartman, 09-cv-0844, 2010 WL 146319, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 
11, 2010), in both her official capacity (pursuant to the 
Eleventh Amendment) as well as her individual capacity (in 
accordance with the doctrine of quasi-official immunity), id. 
at *6-*7. 
5
 The orders accompanying the Hartman opinions 
granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss without stating the 
reason for doing so.  The second order did state that any 
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judgment in October 2010.  See Ball v. Hartman, 396 F. 
App’x 823, 825 (3d Cir. 2010) (per curiam). 
 
In June 2011, Ball filed another lawsuit, this time 
against the state court judge who had ordered her transferred 
to SCI-Muncy.  Ball alleged that the judge ordered the 
transfer with malicious intent.  See Ball v. Butts, No. 11-cv-
1068 (M.D. Pa.).  The District Court dismissed that case 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) because the 
defendant was entitled to absolute immunity.  See Butts, No. 
11-cv-1068 (Doc. 8).  We dismissed the appeal, stating that it 
was frivolous because it “lack[ed] an arguable basis either in 
law or in fact,” Ball v. Butts, 445 F. App’x 457, 457 (3d Cir. 
2011) (nonprecedential), due to the absolute immunity of the 
defendant judge and the lack of any evidence of malice. 
 
Ball filed many other lawsuits in the District Court, all 
of which followed the same basic pattern as SCI Muncy, 
Hartman, and Butts.  She has a total of more than thirty 
                                                                                                     
appeal from the order “is deemed frivolous and not in good 
faith,” a certification made pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1915(a)(3).  Ball v. Hartman, No. 09-cv-0844, 2010 WL 
597401, *4 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 2010).  It nevertheless appears 
that Ball’s Hartman complaint was dismissed for failure to 
state a claim, because the Court characterized the personal 
involvement of a § 1983 defendant as an element of the 
claim.  See id. at *2 (listing “conduct complained of ... 
committed by a person acting under color of state law” as one 
of the “essential elements” of a § 1983 claim); Hartman, 2010 
WL 146319, at *6 (“The complaint lacks any allegations 
against [the defendant], who is not a prison employee, but 
rather, a court administrator in Northhampton County.”). 
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actions to her name as of the date of this opinion.  All but five 
of them have been dismissed by the District Court, and those 
remaining five are still pending.  As a result of the dismissals, 
Ball currently has twenty-two appeals before us in addition to 
the present appeals.
6
    
  
 2.  The Present Appeals 
 
Ball commenced this particular lawsuit on April 14, 
2008, and filed an amended complaint on March 12, 2010.  
The amended complaint endeavors to advance Eighth 
Amendment claims of deliberate indifference to Ball’s 
medical needs based on the quality of care that she received 
between 2006 and 2008.  Ball also filed a motion for a 
preliminary injunction, which the District Court denied by 
order dated December 8, 2011.  Ball filed a timely notice of 
appeal.
7
 
 
                                              
6
 That does not include two additional appeals related 
to the case from which the present appeals arise, Nos. 10-
1700, 11-2629.  We decided the appeal at 10-1700, affirming 
the District Court’s denial of another of Ball’s motions for a 
preliminary injunction (not the one presently at issue).  See 
Ball v. Dr. Famiglio et al., 396 F. App’x 836 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(per curiam).  The appeal at 11-2629 was dismissed for 
failure to prosecute.   
7
 Her notice of appeal was filed on January 4, 2012, 
and her appeal was docketed on January 17, 2012 as No. 12-
1067.  As discussed in Part II.A.3, infra, the date an appeal 
commences is important for determining whether a dismissal 
counts as a PLRA strike for purposes of that appeal.   
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Ball originally sued some twenty-eight corrections 
officers, medical personnel, and contract health providers 
employed or providing services at SCI-Muncy.  Through the 
process of pretrial litigation, the number of defendants was 
reduced, so that the complaint named thirteen department of 
corrections medical and correctional staff as defendants, 
along with five contract health providers who provided 
medical treatment to Ball.  In response to motions by the 
defendants, the District Court also dismissed a number of 
claims from the lawsuit, leaving only claims for inadequate 
medical treatment.   
 
On August 15, 2011, the remaining defendants filed 
motions for summary judgment.  The assigned Magistrate 
Judge subsequently issued a Report and Recommendation 
that summary judgment be granted based on Ball’s failure to 
exhaust her administrative remedies.  See Ball v. SCI Muncy, 
No. 08-cv-700, (Doc. 216).   On May 22, 2012, the District 
Court adopted the recommendation and granted summary 
judgment to the defendants with respect to all of Ball’s 
claims.  See Ball v. SCI Muncy, No. 08-cv-700 (Doc. 239). 
 
 Ball again timely appealed,
8
 and the two appeals – the 
first from the denial of a preliminary injunction and the 
second from the rulings on the merits – were consolidated.  
On June 20, 2012, Ball filed a motion to proceed IFP as well 
as two motions asserting that she was in imminent danger of 
serious physical injury.
9
  She also filed a motion for 
                                              
8
 Her notice of appeal was filed on June 4, 2012, and 
her appeal was docketed June 8, 2012 as No. 12-2604. 
9
 In August 2012, the District Court revoked Ball’s IFP 
status on the grounds that she had accrued three strikes, 
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appointment of counsel.  Those motions were referred to this 
merits panel, and amicus counsel was appointed.
10
  
 
II. DISCUSSION
11
 
 
To date, Ball has accumulated more than twenty-five 
dismissals of actions and appeals by the District Court and 
this Court.  How to consider those dismissals for purposes of 
the PLRA is what is principally at issue now.  As discussed 
above, under the PLRA’s “three strikes” provision, a prisoner 
may not “bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil 
action or proceeding” if the prisoner has, on three or more 
prior occasions, had an action or appeal “dismissed on the 
grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim 
upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under 
                                                                                                     
counting its own dismissals in Hartman and Butts and our 
dismissal of the Butts appeal.  See Ball v. Hummel, No. 12-cv-
0814, 2012 WL 3614045, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 21, 2012). 
10
 Our Amicus is the Appellate Litigation Clinic of the 
Earle Mack School of Law at Drexel University, for whose 
diligent and expert assistance we express sincere gratitude. 
 
11
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a)(3), (a)(4).  We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Because the issues raised in this 
appeal arise from Ball’s motion to proceed IFP, and the 
District Court did not address her IFP status in this case, there 
is no district court order under review.  However, this case 
presents questions of law regarding the proper interpretation 
of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), which would be subject to plenary 
review in any event.  Gibbs v. Cross, 160 F.3d 962, 964 (3d 
Cir. 1998).   
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imminent danger of serious physical injury.”  28 U.S.C. 
§ 1915(g).  The District Court did not dispose of Ball’s claims 
in this case under the three strikes provision, but rather based 
on Ball’s failure to exhaust her administrative remedies, as 
required under another provision of the PLRA, see 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1997e(a).  However, in her appeal to us, Ball has requested 
permission to proceed IFP, which requires that we determine 
whether she is eligible for that status in light of the three 
strikes rule. 
 
Given the character of previous dismissals in Ball’s 
legal proceedings, this appeal necessitates a determination of 
whether a dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative 
remedies counts as a PLRA strike, and whether dismissal on 
the basis of absolute immunity qualifies as a PLRA strike.  
Because we conclude that Ball had three strikes for purposes 
of the PLRA at the time she filed the present appeals, we 
must also determine whether she may still proceed IFP based 
on imminent danger of serious physical injury.  We take up 
each of those questions in turn. 
 
 A.  Application of the PLRA’s Three Strikes Rule 
  1. Dismissals for Failure to Exhaust 
The PLRA provides that “[n]o action shall be brought 
with respect to prison conditions ... by a prisoner confined in 
any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such 
administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”  42 
U.S.C. § 1997e(a).  “Requiring exhaustion allows prison 
officials an opportunity to resolve disputes concerning the 
exercise of their responsibilities before being haled into 
court.”  Bock, 549 U.S. at 204.  It also “has the potential to 
reduce the number of inmate suits, and also to improve the 
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quality of suits that are filed by producing a useful 
administrative record.”  Id.   
 
In their “attempt[s] to implement the exhaustion 
requirement, some lower courts have imposed procedural 
rules that have become the subject of varying levels of 
disagreement among the federal courts of appeals.”  Id.  One 
issue on which the circuits are split is the interaction of the 
PLRA’s exhaustion requirement and the three strikes rule.  
The majority view seems to be that, based on the plain 
language of the three strikes provision, which does not 
mention exhaustion, dismissal for failure to exhaust does not 
count as a PLRA strike.  See Turley v. Gaetz, 625 F.3d 1005, 
1013 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[N]either  the dismissal of a complaint 
in its entirety for failure to exhaust nor the dismissal of 
unexhausted claims from an action containing other viable 
claims constitutes a strike under § 1915(g).”); Owens v. Isaac, 
487 F.3d 561, 563 (8th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (“The first 
case was dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies; such a dismissal is not a strike under 
section 1915(g).”); Green v. Young, 454 F.3d 405, 409 (4th 
Cir. 2006) (“[R]outine dismissal on exhaustion grounds is not 
a strike for purposes of the PLRA.”);  Snider v. Melindez, 199 
F.3d 108, 115 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[D]ismissal by reason of a 
remediable failure to exhaust should not count as a strike.”).   
Courts following the majority approach treat failure to 
exhaust as an affirmative defense, so that “[a] prisoner’s 
failure to exhaust administrative remedies is statutorily 
distinct from his failure to state a claim upon which relief 
may be granted.” Turley, 625 F.3d at 1013. 
 
However, there are decisions holding that failure to 
exhaust constitutes a strike, notwithstanding that exhaustion 
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is not mentioned in §1915(g).  The reasoning is that an action 
“that fails to allege the requisite exhaustion of remedies is 
tantamount to one that fails to state a claim upon which relief 
may be granted,” which is a specified ground for a strike.  
Rivera v. Allin, 144 F.3d 719, 731 (11th Cir. 1998), 
abrogated in part by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007).  
Courts following that line start from the premise that, due to 
the mandatory nature of exhaustion, it is an “essential 
allegation of a prisoner’s claim.”  Steele v. Fed. Bureau of 
Prisons, 355 F.3d 1204, 1209 (10th Cir. 2003), abrogated in 
part by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007).  They thus 
“conclude that § 1997e(a) imposes a pleading requirement on 
the prisoner,” so that if the plaintiff fails to plead exhaustion, 
the court may dismiss the complaint on a Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion.  Id. at 1210.  That minority view appears also to be 
based, in part, on the observation that exhaustion should not 
be seen as an affirmative defense “because it cannot be 
waived.”  Id. at 1209 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c) (“Failure to 
plead an affirmative defense results in a waiver of that 
defense.”)).12        
 
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit follows neither the majority nor the 
                                              
12
 That conclusion is at odds with the Supreme Court’s 
subsequent holding in Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007), 
that “failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense under the 
PLRA, and … inmates are not required to specially plead or 
demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints.”  549 U.S. at 216.  
However, Bock addressed only the PLRA’s screening 
requirements, and not the three strikes rule, and, as discussed 
below, left open the possibility that failure to exhaust could 
be a basis for dismissal for failure to state a claim.   
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minority approach.  In Thompson v. Drug Enforcement 
Administration, it suggested instead that, “[b]ecause there is 
no categorical answer to the question whether failure to 
exhaust administrative remedies counts as failure to state a 
claim for Rule 12(b)(6) purposes, the question likewise has 
no categorical answer under section 1915(g), the language of 
which Congress clearly modeled on Rule 12(b)(6).”  492 F.3d 
428, 438 (D.C. Cir. 2007).  The Thompson Court reasoned 
that, “if a particular statute requires the plaintiff to plead 
exhaustion and the plaintiff fails to do so, the court may 
dismiss the complaint on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion,” but that, 
“even when failure to exhaust is treated as an affirmative 
defense, it may be invoked in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion if the 
complaint somehow reveals the exhaustion defense on its 
face.”  Id.  The D.C. Circuit has thus chosen to establish a 
“bright-line rule that avoids the need to relitigate past cases”: 
“if the court dismisses an unexhausted complaint on a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion or if it dismisses the complaint sua sponte 
and expressly declares that the complaint fails to state a 
claim, the dismissal counts as a strike.”  Id.   
 
We have not previously addressed the issue of how 
exhaustion may relate to the three strikes rule, but we did 
consider two related issues in Ray v. Kertes, 285 F.3d 287 (3d 
Cir. 2002).  In that case, the district court dismissed a 
prisoner’s complaint before the defendants were served 
because the prisoner had not set forth any steps he had taken 
to exhaust administrative remedies.  He argued on appeal that 
failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense that must be 
pleaded and proven by the defendants in a PLRA action, and 
he relied in part on Williams v. Runyon, 130 F.3d 568 (3d Cir. 
1997), a Title VII case in which we stated that “failure to 
exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense in 
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the nature of statute[s] of limitations.”  Ray, 285 F.3d at 292 
(quoting Williams, 130 F.3d at 573) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  We noted in Ray that the majority of appellate 
courts that had considered the issue had held that the PLRA’s 
exhaustion requirement is an affirmative defense.  See id. at 
293 (collecting cases).  We also observed that “considerations 
of policy [and] fairness” come into play when categorizing a 
pleading requirement as an affirmative defense, id. at 295 
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted), and 
that “it appears that it is considerably easier for a prison 
administrator to show a failure to exhaust than it is for a 
prisoner to demonstrate exhaustion.”  Id.13  We thus “join[ed] 
the many other circuits that have held that failure to exhaust is 
an affirmative defense to be pleaded by the defendant.”  Id.  
 
We also considered in Ray whether failure to exhaust 
constituted grounds for a court’s sua sponte dismissal 
pursuant to the PLRA’s prescreening provision, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1997e(c).  As noted earlier, supra Part II.A, that provision 
permits dismissal of an action or claim that is “frivolous, 
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be 
                                              
13
 The Tenth Circuit in Steele explicitly rejected that 
part of our reasoning in Ray.  It observed that “[a] showing of 
exhaustion does not rely solely on the maintenance of an 
efficient filing and retrieval system” and that “[t]he prisoner 
outlines his own grievance in the prison administrative 
system and frames his allegations in federal court.” Steele, 
355 F.3d at 1210.  As a result, the Court concluded that “it is 
the prisoner who can best assert the relationship between his 
administrative grievance and court filing,” id., so that there is 
“no inequity in placing the burden of pleading exhaustion on 
the prisoner,” id. at 1209.   
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granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is 
immune from such relief.”  42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).  Applying 
the principle of “expressio unius est exclusio alterius – when 
a statute specifically enumerates some categories, it impliedly 
excludes others,” Ray, 285 F.3d at 296, we said that 
“[n]otably absent from the list is any reference to failure to 
exhaust.”  Id.   We also observed that the final sentence of 
§ 1997e(c)(2) states that “‘the court may dismiss the 
underlying claim ... without first requiring the exhaustion of 
administrative remedies,’ [which] shows that Congress had 
not forgotten about the need for exhaustion, but chose not to 
include failure to exhaust among the grounds for which the 
court could dismiss sua sponte.”  Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1997e(c)(2)).  And we reasoned that “[t]he statutory 
structure also belies any possibility that a failure to exhaust is 
included in [§ 1997e](c)(1)’s broad rubric of ‘failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted.’”  Id. at 296 n.9; 
accord Snider, 199 F.3d at 112 (concluding that “fail[ure] to 
state a claim as used in Section[] 1997e(c) ... of the PLRA 
does not include failure to exhaust administrative remedies” 
(first alteration in original) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  Based on the foregoing, we concluded that 
“Congress did not intend to include failure to exhaust among 
the categories justifying sua sponte dismissal,” Ray, 285 F.3d 
at 296, either as an independent ground or under the guise of 
failure to state a claim. 
 
Our holdings in Ray, and the reasoning on which they 
were based, would seem to compel us to follow the majority 
rule and conclude that dismissal for failure to exhaust does 
not constitute a strike under the PLRA.  Like the prescreening 
provisions, the language of § 1915(g) does not include failure 
to exhaust in the list of enumerated strike grounds, indicating 
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that Congress did not intend for a dismissal based on 
exhaustion to count as a strike.  The majority view is also 
consistent with our conclusion in Ray that failure to exhaust is 
an affirmative defense, rather than an element of a prisoner’s 
claim, and that it does not constitute a basis for sua sponte 
dismissal for failure to state a claim.  
 
Despite that, however, dictum in Jones v. Bock 
suggests that we should follow the D.C. Circuit’s approach 
and adopt a clear but flexible rule.
14
  In Bock, even as it held 
that exhaustion is an affirmative defense, see supra note 12, 
the Supreme Court added that “that is not to say that failure to 
exhaust cannot be a basis for dismissal for failure to state a 
claim.” Bock, 549 U.S. at 216.  The Court observed that “[a] 
complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim if 
the allegations, taken as true, show the plaintiff is not entitled 
to relief,” and that “[w]hether a particular ground for 
opposing a claim may be the basis for dismissal for failure to 
state a claim depends on whether the allegations in the 
complaint suffice to establish that ground, not on the nature of 
the ground in the abstract.”  Id. at 215.  For example, if the 
allegations in a complaint “show that relief is barred by the 
applicable statute of limitations, the complaint is subject to 
dismissal for failure to state a claim[,] [but] that does not 
make the statute of limitations any less an affirmative 
                                              
14
 We have previously explained that “we should not 
idly ignore considered statements the Supreme Court makes 
in dicta” because the Court “uses dicta to help control and 
influence the many issues it cannot decide because of its 
limited docket,” and because ignoring it “increase[s] the 
disparity” among the Courts of Appeals.  In re McDonald, 
205 F.3d 606, 612 (3d Cir. 2000). 
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defense.”  Id.  The D.C. Circuit’s rule, which was based on 
that reasoning in Bock, admits the possibility that “even when 
failure to exhaust is treated as an affirmative defense, it may 
be invoked in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion if the complaint 
somehow reveals the exhaustion defense on its face.”  
Thompson, 492 F.3d at 438.  That approach is also consistent 
with the law of this Circuit concerning affirmative defenses 
and motions to dismiss.  See Leveto v. Lapina, 258 F.3d 156, 
161 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[A] complaint may be subject to 
dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) when an affirmative defense ... 
appears on its face.”).15  Cf. Robinson v. Johnson, 313 F.3d 
128, 135 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting that “the law of this Circuit 
(the so-called ‘Third Circuit Rule’) permits a limitations 
defense to be raised by a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), but 
only if the time alleged in the statement of a claim shows that 
the cause of action has not been brought within the statute of 
limitations.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).16 
                                              
15
 The Bock Court cited Leveto v. Lapina, 258 F.3d 
156 (3d Cir. 2001), in support of its statement that an 
affirmative defense, such as failure to exhaust, may be the 
basis of a dismissal for failure to state a claim.  See Bock, 549 
U.S. at 215. 
16
 As we noted in Robinson, “[t]he ‘Third Circuit Rule’ 
dates back at least to 1948 when we recognized ... that 
affirmative defenses are ordinarily pleaded pursuant to Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 8(c), but that [a] defense could be raised in other 
ways.”  Robinson v. Johnson, 313 F.3d 128, 135 n.3 (3d Cir. 
2002) (citing Hartmann v. Time, Inc., 166 F.2d 127, 139 (3d 
Cir. 1947)).  Since that time, we have acknowledged that a 
number of affirmative defenses that are not listed in Rule 
12(b) could still be made by motion, provided that the basis 
of the defense was apparent on the face of the complaint.  
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We thus adopt the following rule as it relates to 
exhaustion and PLRA strikes: dismissal based on a prisoner’s 
failure to exhaust administrative remedies does not constitute 
a PLRA strike, unless a court explicitly and correctly 
concludes that the complaint reveals the exhaustion defense 
on its face and the court then dismisses the unexhausted 
complaint for failure to state a claim.  The first part of the rule 
– pertaining to cases in which the exhaustion defense is not 
apparent in the complaint – is likely to cover “the majority of 
cases ... [so that] the defense will not be raised on a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion and the dismissal will not count as a strike.”  
Thompson, 492 F.3d at 438.  The second part – which applies 
when a court has correctly determined that the exhaustion 
defense is apparent on the face of the complaint – follows 
from the statutory text of § 1915(g) and our own “Third 
Circuit Rule.”  “When a court dismisses an unexhausted 
complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), thus concluding that the 
                                                                                                     
See, e.g., Rycoline Prods., Inc. v. C & W Unltd., 109 F.3d 
883, 886 (3d Cir. 1997) (affirmative defense must be apparent 
on the face of the complaint to be subject to a Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion to dismiss);  Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & 
Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1384 n.1 (3d Cir.1994) (“While the 
language of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c) indicates that a statute of 
limitations defense cannot be used in the context of a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, an exception is made where the 
complaint facially shows noncompliance with the limitations 
period and the affirmative defense clearly appears on the face 
of the pleading.”);  Williams v. Murdoch, 330 F.2d 745, 749 
(3d Cir. 1964) (affirmative defense of res judicata may be 
raised by a motion to dismiss or by an answer). 
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complaint fails to state a claim, section 1915(g)’s plain text 
compels us to count that case as a strike.”  Id.17  
                                              
17
 The second part of the rule requires that the 
dismissal based on failure to exhaust, pursuant to Rule 
12(b)(6), be with prejudice.  “We assume that Congress is 
aware of existing law when it passes legislation,” Miles v. 
Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 32 (1990), and Congress 
used the language of Rule 12(b)(6) in the PLRA’s three 
strikes provision.   See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (strike accrues on 
dismissal of an action that “fails to state a claim upon which 
relief may be granted”).  A dismissal for failure to state a 
claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is presumed to be a judgment on 
the merits unless otherwise specified.  See Federated Dep’t 
Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 399 n.3 (1981) (“The 
dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is a judgment on the merits.”  
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).  “It follows 
that the type of prior dismissal for failure to state a claim 
contemplated by § 1915(g) is one that constituted an 
adjudication on the merits and prejudiced the filing of a 
subsequent complaint with the same allegations.”  McLean v. 
United States, 566 F.3d 391, 396 (4th Cir. 2009).  By 
contrast, a dismissal for failure to exhaust without prejudice is 
not an adjudication on the merits.  See Cooter & Gell v. 
Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 396 (1990) (“[D]ismissal ... 
without prejudice is a dismissal that does not operat[e] as an 
adjudication upon the merits ... .” (alterations in original) 
(citing and quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  Consequently, a dismissal for 
failure to state a claim on exhaustion grounds without 
prejudice “does not fall within the plain and unambiguous 
meaning of § 1915(g)’s unqualified phrase ‘dismissed ... [for] 
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  2.  Dismissals Due to Absolute Immunity 
 
The PLRA’s prescreening provisions require a court to 
dismiss an action or an appeal at any time the court 
determines that the plaintiff  “seeks monetary relief” from “a 
defendant who is immune from such relief.”  28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii), 1915A(b)(2); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1).  
But, like failure to exhaust, immunity is not one of the 
enumerated  grounds for a strike under § 1915(g), which 
indicates that Congress did not intend for dismissal on 
immunity grounds to count as a strike.  See Russello v. United 
States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (“[W]here Congress includes 
particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in 
another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that 
Congress acts intentionally and purposefully in the disparate 
inclusion or exclusion.” (alteration in original) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted)).  Also, immunity is an 
affirmative defense, so that a prisoner’s failure to plead that 
the defendant was not immune would not normally provide a 
basis for dismissal for failure to state a claim.  See Ray, 285 
F.3d at 297 (noting that the Supreme Court has criticized the 
creation of heightened pleading standards in the PLRA 
context).  Thus, it would seem clear that a dismissal due to 
the immunity of the defendant does not, on its own, count as a 
PLRA strike.  See Thompson, 492 F.3d at 439 (declining to 
treat all dismissals under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A as strikes, in part 
                                                                                                     
fail[ure] to state a claim’” and “does not count as a strike.”  
McLean, 566 F.3d at 397 (alterations in original).  The 
District Court did not state that any of the dismissals at issue 
in these appeals were without prejudice, and so they are 
presumed to be with prejudice, and they “operate[] as an 
adjudication on the merits.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). 
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because that provision “requires dismissal of complaints that 
‘seek[ ] monetary relief from a defendant who is immune 
from such relief’ – a  reason not covered by section 1915(g)” 
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(2))). 
 
Again, however, affirmative defenses may be apparent 
on the face of a prisoner’s complaint, and immunity could, 
like failure to exhaust, provide the basis of a dismissal 
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).  See Pani v. Empire Blue Cross 
Blue Shield, 152 F.3d 67, 74-75 (2d Cir. 1998) (dismissing a 
complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) because “the complaint itself 
establishes the facts necessary to sustain defendant’s 
immunity defense”).  Under our Court’s practice, then, 
immunity could in certain cases justify a dismissal that would 
count as a PLRA strike.  In addition, “[o]ne of the purposes of 
immunity, absolute or qualified, is to spare a defendant not 
only unwarranted liability, but unwarranted demands 
customarily imposed on those defending a long drawn out 
lawsuit.”  Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991).  For 
that reason, “[i]t is also well established that an affirmative 
defense of official immunity should be resolved as early as 
possible by the court ... .” Pani, 152 F.3d at 75; see also 
Vaughn v. U.S. Small Bus. Admin., 65 F.3d 1322, 1326 (6th 
Cir. 1995) (“To avoid imposing needless discovery costs 
upon government officials, the determination of qualified 
immunity must be made at an early stage in the litigation.”).  
That suggests that, when a prisoner sues a defendant who is 
immune, the court should grant a pre-answer motion to 
dismiss based on the affirmative defense of immunity 
“without resort to summary judgment procedure, if the 
defense appears on the face of the complaint.”  Pani, 152 
F.3d at 74. 
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Some courts have gone further, suggesting that a 
dismissal based on immunity may be tantamount to a 
dismissal for frivolousness, which, like failure to state a 
claim, is an enumerated basis for a PLRA strike.  See, e.g., 
Hafed v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 635 F.3d 1172, 1178 (10th 
Cir. 2011) (construing a district court’s dismissal to “mean 
that the immunity ground for dismissal was subsumed in 
frivolousness or appellant’s failure to state a claim, because 
appellant affirmatively asserted facts showing that he could 
not meet the expropriation exception to [defendant’s] 
immunity” (emphasis in original)).  The Second Circuit has, 
in fact, decided that prisoner actions against defendants who 
enjoy absolute immunity are per se frivolous.  See Mills v. 
Fischer, 645 F.3d 176, 177 (2d Cir. 2011) (“The IFP statute 
does not explicitly categorize as frivolous a claim dismissed 
by reason of judicial immunity, but we will: [a]ny claim 
dismissed on the ground of absolute judicial immunity is 
‘frivolous’ for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).”). 
 
The text of the PLRA, however, treats dismissal for 
frivolousness as separate and distinct from dismissal on 
grounds of immunity.  Like failure to state a claim, 
frivolousness is listed as a ground for prescreening dismissal, 
and it is listed separately and distinctly from dismissal due to 
immunity.  Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), and id. 
§ 915A(b)(1) (requiring dismissal of an action that is 
frivolous), with id. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii), and id. § 1915A(b)(2) 
(dismissal on grounds that the defendant is immune from suit 
for monetary relief).  And again like failure to state a claim, 
dismissal for frivolousness is an enumerated strike ground, 
see id. § 1915(g), while dismissal based on immunity is not.  
Moreover, to automatically treat a district court’s dismissal on 
immunity grounds as one for frivolousness gives inadequate 
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deference to the district court.  “[T]he district courts[] …  are 
all too familiar with factually frivolous claims, [and] are in 
the best position to determine which cases fall into this 
category.  Indeed, the [IFP] statute’s instruction that an action 
may be dismissed if the court is satisfied that it is frivolous 
indicates that frivolousness is a decision entrusted to the 
discretion of the court entertaining the in forma pauperis 
petition.”  Denton, 504 U.S. at 33 (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted).
18
  We therefore decline to treat a 
                                              
18
 We note, however, that Denton preceded the 
enactment of the PLRA, and that, although it is up to the 
district court to make the frivolousness determination, the 
dismissal of a frivolous action is now mandatory.  See 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), 1915A(b)(1); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1997e(c).  We also note that a district court may base its 
frivolousness determination either on its conclusion that “a 
claim [is] based on an indisputably meritless legal theory” or 
on a finding that “the complaint’s factual allegations ... are 
clearly baseless,” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S 319, 327 
(1989), and that we suggest deference only to the latter.  Cf. 
Denton, 504 U.S. at 33 (concluding that “a finding of factual 
frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the 
level of the irrational or the wholly incredible” and that “the 
district courts[] ... are in the best position to determine which 
cases fall into this category”); Roman v. Jeffes, 904 F.2d 192, 
194 (3d Cir. 1990) (stating that “[o]ur review of a district 
court decision dismissing a complaint as frivolous is plenary” 
but acknowledging that a district court may base its 
frivolousness determination either on its conclusion that a 
claim is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory” or 
on a finding that the complaint’s “factual contentions are 
clearly baseless”). 
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district court’s dismissal due to the defendant’s immunity as a 
per se dismissal for frivolousness for purposes of the PLRA’s 
three strikes rule.
19
 
                                              
19
 Although we do not think that a dismissal on the 
ground of immunity is per se a dismissal for frivolousness, 
we reiterate that the district courts are free to conclude that an 
action is frivolous because the defendant is immune – and to 
clearly state frivolousness as the reason for the dismissal.  As 
the Second Circuit recognized in announcing its per se rule, 
when a defendant enjoys absolute judicial immunity, the 
action is quite likely frivolous.  See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 
U.S. 349, 356 (1978) (“A judge will not be deprived of 
immunity because the action he took was in error, was done 
maliciously, or was in excess of his authority ... .”).  But even 
judicial immunity has its limits.  See id. at 356-57 (noting that 
a judge “will be subject to liability ... when he has acted in the 
clear absence of all jurisdiction” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  And, more generally, a prisoner could have made a 
nonfrivolous claim by pleading facts that demonstrated that 
an exception to absolute immunity applied, or that the 
requirements of qualified immunity were not satisfied, even 
though the district court ultimately determined that the 
immunity defense remained intact and dismissed the 
complaint on that basis.  Cf. Hafed v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 
635 F.3d 1172, 1178 (10th Cir. 2011) (observing that a claim 
against an immune defendant “could properly be dismissed 
by a district court sua sponte as frivolous” but only “if it [is] 
clear from the face of the complaint that the defendant was 
absolutely immune from suit and no further factual 
development was required”).    
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Instead, we hold that dismissal based on the immunity 
of the defendant, whether absolute or qualified, does not 
constitute a PLRA strike, including a strike based on 
frivolousness, unless a court explicitly and correctly 
                                                                                                     
We also emphasize that we may dismiss as frivolous 
an appeal of an action dismissed on immunity grounds.  The 
PLRA counts each “occasion[]” on which “an action or 
appeal” is dismissed on one of the enumerated grounds as a 
separate strike, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), so that we may dismiss 
an appeal as frivolous, causing the prisoner to accrue a strike, 
see Hafed, 635 F.3d at 1179, even if the district court 
dismissed the action solely on grounds of immunity.  And, in 
fact, a district court may certify that an appeal would not be 
taken in good faith, even if it dismissed the action on grounds 
other than frivolousness.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).  
Certainly, if the District Court certifies that an appeal would 
not be taken in good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), 
and we dismiss the appeal under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) on the 
same grounds as those on which the District Court based its 
dismissal, then dismissal of the appeal should count as a 
strike.  But even if the District Court did not certify that an 
appeal would be lacking a good faith basis, we may “consider 
the nature of the dismissal,” Hafed, 635 F.3d at 1178, such 
that the appeal may itself be dismissed as frivolous.  In the 
case of a district court’s dismissal based on immunity, our 
determination that the appeal may be dismissed as frivolous 
would be proper when the prisoner “affirmatively asserted 
facts showing” that the defendant was immune from suit for a 
monetary remedy and that none of the exceptions to such 
immunity applied, so that he had no “legally valid claim.” Id. 
(emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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concludes that the complaint reveals the immunity defense on 
its face and dismisses the unexhausted complaint under Rule 
12(b)(6) or expressly states that the ground for the dismissal 
is frivolousness.
20
 
 
  3.  Other Questions of Strike Computation 
 
Before applying the rules adopted in the previous 
sections to the dismissals of Ball’s various actions, we 
address four more questions, first reviewing our recent 
answers to two questions of PLRA strike calculation and 
then resolving two additional questions.  The first question is 
whether “unclear” dismissals can be counted as strikes for 
purposes of § 1915(g).  We answered “no” to that inquiry 
earlier this year in Byrd v. Shannon, 715 F.3d 117 (3d Cir. 
2013).  Byrd concerned the dismissal of a prisoner’s appeal 
pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B) because it was “without merit.”  
Id. at 121 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Confronted 
with that unclear dismissal, we said that 
 
a strike under § 1915(g) will accrue only if the 
entire action or appeal is (1) dismissed 
explicitly because it is “frivolous,” “malicious,” 
or “fails to state a claim” or (2) dismissed 
pursuant to a statutory provision or rule that is 
limited solely to dismissals for such reasons, 
including (but not necessarily limited to) 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1), 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), 
                                              
20
 As with a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal based on failure to 
exhaust, a dismissal based on immunity must be with 
prejudice, if it is to count as a strike.  See supra note 17. 
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1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), or Rule 12(b)(6) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Id. at 126.  In announcing that rule, we rejected an alternative 
approach under which “courts are permitted to consider the 
nature of the dismissal and determine whether the dismissal 
fits within the language of § 1915(g),” because we felt that 
such an approach would “open the door to more litigation ... 
.”  Id.  Applying the rule, we concluded that our dismissal of 
the appeal in question did not constitute a strike, because 
“[t]he terms ‘frivolous,’ ‘malicious,’ or ‘fails to state a claim’ 
were not used to dismiss the appeal” and because “[s]ection 
1915(e)(2)(B) is not limited to dismissals that are ‘frivolous,’ 
‘malicious,’ or ‘fail[] to state a claim.’”  Id. (second alteration 
in original). 
 
The second question is whether dismissal of some 
claims within an action on grounds that would constitute a 
strike, without dismissal of the entire action, causes the 
prisoner to accrue a strike.  Byrd also settled that question, 
holding that “a strike under § 1915(g) will accrue only if the 
entire action or appeal” is dismissed on one of the enumerated 
grounds, or based on a statutory provision that limits 
dismissal to one or more of those grounds.  Id.; see also id. at 
125 (“We agree with the majority of our sister courts of 
appeals that § 1915(g) requires that a prisoner’s entire action 
or appeal be dismissed on enumerated grounds in order for 
the dismissal to count as a strike.”).  That rule is consistent 
with the plain language of the PLRA’s three strikes provision, 
which refers to dismissals of an “action or appeal,” 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1915(g), rather than the dismissal of individual claims.
21
  It 
                                              
21
 Other circuits have come to the same conclusion.  
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is also consistent with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
the PLRA’s exhaustion provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).  See 
Bock, 549 U.S. at 221 (“As a general matter, if a complaint 
contains both good and bad claims, the court proceeds with 
the good and leaves the bad.  [O]nly the bad claims are 
dismissed; the complaint as a whole is not. If Congress meant 
to depart from this norm, we would expect some indication of 
that, and we find none.” (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted)).   
 
The third question is whether, on appeal, an affirmance 
of a dismissal (whether or not it was on grounds that would 
cause the prisoner to accrue a strike) counts as a separate 
strike.  Byrd does not directly address that issue, and we have 
not previously resolved it, but we think the answer is clear.  
The PLRA three strikes provision speaks of possible strikes 
only in terms of “an action or appeal ... that was dismissed” 
                                                                                                     
See, e.g., Tolbert v. Stevenson, 635 F.3d 646, 651 (4th Cir. 
2011) (holding that “§ 1915(g) requires that a prisoner’s 
entire ‘action or appeal’ be dismissed on enumerated grounds 
in order to count as a strike”); Turley v. Gaetz, 625 F.3d 1005, 
1009 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding that “a strike is incurred for an 
action dismissed in its entirety on one or more of the three 
enumerated grounds”); Pointer v. Wilkinson, 502 F.3d 369, 
372-73 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that “if some claims … were 
found to have merit, then the dismissal of other frivolous 
claims would not render the dismissal a strike” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); Thompson v. Drug Enforcement 
Admin., 492 F.3d 428, 432 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding that the 
plain language of § 1915(g) provides that a plaintiff incurs a 
strike only when the entire action is dismissed on one of the 
listed grounds). 
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on one of the enumerated grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).  
Thus,“[u]nder the plain language of the statute, only a 
dismissal may count as a strike, not the affirmance of an 
earlier decision to dismiss.”  Jennings v. Natrona Cnty. Det. 
Med. Facility, 175 F.3d 775, 780 (10th Cir. 1999).  Also, as 
noted in Thompson, “[t]he choice of the word ‘dismiss’ rather 
than ‘affirm’ in relation to appeals was unlikely an act of 
careless draftsmanship,” but rather may be “most plausibly 
understood as a reference to section 1915(e)(2), which 
requires the court to ‘dismiss the case at any time if the court 
determines that ... the action or appeal ... is frivolous or 
malicious; [or] fails to state a claim on which relief may be 
granted.’”  Thompson, 492 F.3d at 436 (emphasis and 
alterations in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), 
(e)(2)(B)(iii)).  Therefore, a dismissal of an appeal on one of 
the enumerated grounds counts as a PLRA strike, while an 
affirmance of a district court’s dismissal does not, even if the 
underlying dismissal itself counts as a strike.   
 
The final question is whether a strike accrues as soon 
as an action is dismissed, or only when that dismissal has 
been affirmed on appeal or the opportunity to appeal has 
otherwise come to a close.  The statute is silent on whether a 
prior dismissal must be final to count as a strike and simply 
says that, to bar IFP status, the dismissals need to have 
occurred “on 3 or more prior occasions.”  28 U.S.C. 
§ 1915(g).  But other circuits that have considered the issue 
have concluded that a dismissal must be final before it counts 
as a strike.  See Thompson, 492 F.3d at 439 (noting that “a 
dismissal does not become a strike until an appeal thereof has 
been resolved or waived”); Jennings, 175 F.3d at 780 (“[A] 
§ 1915(e)(2)(B) dismissal should not count against a litigant 
until he has exhausted or waived his appeals.”); Adepegba v. 
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Hammons, 103 F.3d 383, 388 (5th Cir. 1996) (“It is 
uncontroversial from the plain language of the statute that 
Congress intended section 1915(g) only to penalize litigation 
that is truly frivolous, not to freeze out meritorious claims or 
ossify district court errors.  We accordingly read dismissals 
under the statute to include only those for which appeal has 
been exhausted or waived.”).  Cf. Snider, 199 F.3d at 115 
(“We also doubt whether the entry of a strike is properly 
considered at the time an action is dismissed.”).  That rule 
makes sense.  As the Tenth Circuit recognized, “to count 
strikes before the litigant has an opportunity to appeal the 
district court’s dismissal is to risk inadvertently punishing 
nonculpable conduct.”  Jennings, 175 F.3d at 780 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  “For example, a ‘hyper-literal’ 
reading of § 1915(g) to count all district court dismissals as 
‘prior occasions’ whether or not the litigant has appealed 
those decisions could bar a prisoner’s appeal of an erroneous 
third strike, since the appeal would follow three prior 
dismissals.  Or, an indigent prisoner’s fourth claim could 
expire while one or more of his first three dismissals was 
being reversed on appeal.”  Id.  We will therefore follow the 
rule of those circuits that hold that a dismissal does not count 
as a strike until it has been affirmed on appeal, or the 
opportunity to appeal has otherwise concluded.
22
 
                                              
22
 That rule would, of course, mean that dismissal of an 
action that gave rise to an appeal would not count as a strike 
for purposes of that appeal, even if it had been on one of the 
grounds enumerated in § 1915(g).  See Pigg v. FBI, 106 F.3d 
1497, 1498 (10th Cir. 1997) (concluding that, because 
“‘[p]rior’ is defined in Webster's Ninth New Collegiate 
Dictionary as ‘earlier in time,’” the district court erred in 
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  4.  Tallying Ball’s Strikes for Purposes of  
   the Present Appeals 
 
Defendants argue that Ball had accrued at least ten 
strikes for purposes of these appeals.
23
  Three of those 
                                                                                                     
counting the plaintiff’s instant action as one of the three prior 
actions).   
That rule leaves open the question of whether a 
prisoner accrues a strike as soon as a dismissal by the district 
court is affirmed by a court of appeals, or only when the 
Supreme Court has denied or dismissed a petition for writ of 
certiorari or the time for filing one has passed.  Because there 
is no evidence that Ball has filed such petitions, and the time 
for filing with respect to the dismissals at issue in these 
appeals has passed, we need not resolve that question, though 
the logic of our present decision would indicate waiting for 
the certiorari period to close is appropriate.  See Hafed, 635 
F.3d at 1176 (“We now clarify that a strike counts against a 
prisoner from the date of the Supreme Court’s denial or 
dismissal of a petition for writ of certiorari, if the prisoner 
filed one, or from the date when the time to file a petition for 
writ of certiorari expired, if he did not.”).  
23
 Those ten purported strikes are Ball v. SCI Muncy, 
No. 08-cv-0391 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 10, 2008); Ball v. Hartman, 
No. 09-cv-0844, 2010 WL 597401 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 2010); 
Ball v. Butts, No. 11-cv-1068 (M.D. Pa. June 15, 2011), 
appeal dismissed as frivolous, 445 F. App’x 457 (3d Cir. 
2011) (counting as two strikes); Ball v. Beard, No. 09-cv-
0845 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 3, 2012); Ball v. Campbell, No. 11-cv-
2239, 2012 WL 1979462 (M.D. Pa. June 1, 2012); Ball v. 
Giroux, 12-cv-0011, 2012 WL 728069 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 6, 
2012); Ball v. Giroux, No. 12-cv-0812, 2012 WL 3597214 
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dismissals
24
 do not count as strikes because they were not 
final when Ball filed the appeals before us now.  Three 
others
25
 do not count as strikes for present purposes because 
the actions were dismissed after these appeals were filed.  
That leaves the District Court’s dismissal of Ball’s complaints 
in SCI Muncy, Hartman, and Butts and our dismissal of her 
appeal in Butts. 
 
Given the rules set forth in the preceding sections, Ball 
has three strikes that bar her IFP status with respect to both of 
the appeals before us now.
26
  First, although the Court 
dismissed the complaint in SCI Muncy due to failure to 
exhaust, it found that that affirmative defense was plain on 
the face of the complaint, because Ball “states that she did not 
complete the grievance process.”  SCI Muncy, No. 08-cv-
0391 (M.D. Pa.) (Doc. 36, pp. 2-3).   Based on that explicit 
finding, and because the Court dismissed the complaint on 
defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion and we affirmed, that 
dismissal caused Ball to accrue a PLRA strike. 
 
In its dismissal of the Hartman action, the District 
Court discussed both whether Ball had sufficiently pled the 
elements of a § 1983 claim and whether she had alleged a 
                                                                                                     
(M.D. Pa. Aug. 16, 2012); Ball v. D’Addio, 12-cv-0815, 2012 
WL 3597249 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 16, 2012); and Ball v. Sisley, 
11-cv-0877, 2012 WL 5509899 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 2012). 
24
 Beard; Giroux, No 12-cv-0011; and Campbell. 
25
 Giroux, No. 12-cv-0812; D’Addio; and Sisley.  
26
 The analysis is the same for appeals 12-1067 and 12-
2604, now before us, because the operative strikes all 
occurred prior to both of these appeals.     
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cognizable injury-in-fact sufficient for Article III standing.  
See supra note 5.
27
  However, the District Court found that 
Ball failed to plead one of the “essential elements” of a 
§ 1983 claim because she had not alleged the personal 
involvement of the defendants and therefore had not pled 
“that the conduct complained of was committed by a person 
acting under color of state law.”  Hartman, 2010 WL 597401, 
at *2; see also id. (“[E]ach named defendant must be shown, 
via the complaint’s allegations, to have been personally 
involved in the events or occurrences which underlie [the] 
claim.”); Hartman, 2010 WL 146319, at * 5 (observing that 
there were no factual allegations against one of the 
defendants).  The Court thus dismissed the case on 
defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motions for failure to state a claim, 
see Hartman, 2010 WL 597401, at *3; Hartman, 2010 WL 
146319, at *6-*7, we affirmed, and that dismissal represents 
Ball’s second strike. 
 
The District Court’s dismissal of Butts does not count 
as a strike because it was based on immunity.  See Butts, No. 
11-cv-1068 (M.D. Pa.) (Doc. 8) (dismissing the complaint 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii)).  However, we 
dismissed the appeal in Butts as frivolous, saying that “[a]n 
appeal is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis either in law or 
in fact,” and that Ball’s appeal lacked any such basis because 
she had “alleged nothing suggesting that Judge Butts acted in 
the clear absence of all jurisdiction.”  Butts, 445 F. App’x at 
458 (internal quotation marks omitted).
28
  Because 
                                              
27
 The Court also considered the doctrines of Eleventh 
Amendment and quasi-judicial immunity.  See supra note 4. 
28
 We also noted that, “[t]o the extent that Ball’s 
request for injunctive relief might not have been subject to 
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frivolousness is an enumerated strike ground, our dismissal of 
Ball’s Butts appeal caused her to accrue her third strike.  Ball 
therefore had three strikes at the time she commenced these 
appeals, which would generally bar her from proceeding 
IFP.
29
 
 
 B.   Imminent Danger of Serious Physical Injury 
 
Even though Ball has three strikes with respect to both 
of the present appeals, she may proceed IFP if, at the time she 
filed her appeal, she was “under imminent danger of serious 
physical injury.”  28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).  Ball alleges danger of 
serious injury based on each of the types of mistreatment that 
she says she has suffered: burns and bruises sustained at the 
                                                                                                     
dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) [for immunity], it was 
subject to dismissal under § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(ii) [for failure to 
state a claim] because such relief is not available against ‘a 
judicial officer for an act ... taken in such officer’s judicial 
capacity’ ... .”  Butts, 445 F. App’x at 458  (first alteration in 
original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983).        
29
 In August 2012, the District Court revoked Ball’s 
IFP status on the ground that she had accrued three strikes, 
counting its own dismissals in Hartman and Butts and our 
dismissal of the Butts appeal.  See Hummel, 2012 WL 
3614045, at *1; supra note 9.  For the reasons set forth in this 
opinion, the Court’s Butts dismissal does not count because it 
was based on the immunity of the defendant judge.  However, 
the District Court could have revoked Ball’s IFP status at the 
time it dismissed the Hummel action in August 2012, by 
counting its dismissal of SCI Muncy as the third strike.   
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hands of prison personnel, denial of the use of a wheelchair or 
cane and of pain medication for her arthritis, lack of proper 
treatment for her vision, and exposure to mold and mace that 
has aggravated her asthma. 
 
“Before denying leave to proceed IFP, courts must 
review a frequent filer’s well-pled allegations to ensure that 
the prisoner is not in imminent danger” of serious physical 
injury.  Ciarpaglini v. Saini, 352 F.3d 328, 330 (7th Cir. 
2003).  “The imminent danger exception allows the district 
court [or an appellate court] to permit an otherwise barred 
prisoner to file a complaint I.F.P. if the prisoner could be 
subject to serious physical injury and does not then have the 
requisite filing fee.”  Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 
315 (3d Cir. 2001) (en banc).  Congress included the 
exception as a “safety valve for the ‘three strikes’ rule” 
because it “[r]ecogniz[ed] that it could take prisoners [with 
three strikes] a significant period of time to obtain the filing 
fee.”  Id. 
 
“‘Imminent’ dangers are those dangers which are 
about to occur at any moment or are impending.”  Id.  “By 
using the term ‘imminent,’ Congress indicated that it wanted 
to ... prevent impending harms, not those harms that had 
already occurred.”  Id.; see also Medberry v. Butler, 185 F.3d 
1189, 1193 (11th Cir. 1999) (“Congress’ use of the present 
tense in § 1915(g) confirms that a prisoner’s allegation that he 
faced imminent danger sometime in the past is an insufficient 
basis to allow him to proceed in forma pauperis ... .”).  The 
danger must also be imminent at the time the complaint or 
appeal is filed.  See Abdul-Akbar, 239 F.3d at 312 (“[A] 
prisoner may invoke the ‘imminent danger’ exception only to 
seek relief from a danger which is ‘imminent’ at the time the 
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complaint is filed.”); Banos v. O’Guin, 144 F.3d 883, 885 
(5th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he language of § 1915(g), by using the 
present tense, clearly refers to the time when the action or 
appeal is filed ... .”).   
 
Although § 1915(g)’s “imminent danger” exception 
might appear clear in theory, in practice it represents an 
“amorphous standard.”  Ciarpaglini, 352 F.3d at 331.  Courts 
have found imminent danger when a prisoner was placed near 
enemies who had beaten him, Ashley v. Dilworth, 147 F.3d 
715 (8th Cir. 1998), when a prisoner suffered headaches and 
other symptoms as a result of exposure to dust and lint, Gibbs 
v. Cross, 160 F.3d 962 (3d Cir. 1998), and when a prisoner 
needed dental care due to an oral infection, McAlphin v. 
Toney, 281 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 2002).  The denial or 
withdrawal of needed medications can also constitute an 
imminent danger.  See, e.g., Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 
1344, 1346 (11th Cir. 2004) (withdrawal of medications for 
HIV and hepatitis); Ciarpaglini, 352 F.3d at 330 (denial of 
medication for bipolar, attention deficit, and panic disorders).  
 
But “[c]ourts … deny leave to proceed IFP when a 
prisoner’s claims of imminent danger are conclusory or 
ridiculous.”  Ciarpaglini, 352 F.3d at 331.  For example, 
complaining two years later of inadequate protection from 
reprisals by other prisoners can hardly be said to be an 
allegation of “imminent” danger, Heimermann v. Litscher, 
337 F.3d 781, 782 (7th Cir. 2003), just as working in 
inclement weather may not be “danger” at all, Martin v. 
Shelton, 319 F.3d 1048, 1050 (8th Cir. 2003).  Courts also 
reject imminent danger claims when a prisoner alleges only a 
past injury that has not recurred.  See, e.g., Abdul-Akbar, 239 
F.3d at 315 (concluding that being sprayed with pepper spray 
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on one occasion is not imminent danger); Abdul-Wadood v. 
Nathan, 91 F.3d 1023 (7th Cir. 1996) (concluding that being 
given Ibuprofen instead of a stronger pain medication for an 
injury that had already healed is not imminent danger).  And 
“vague and utterly conclusory” assertions that medical 
treatment has been withheld, particularly when a prisoner has 
been seen repeatedly by a physician, do not amount to a 
showing of imminent danger.  White v. Colorado, 157 F.3d 
1226, 1231 (10th Cir. 1998).   
 
Most of Ball’s allegations plainly fail to demonstrate 
imminent danger of serious physical injury that would entitle 
her to the exception to the PLRA bar.  Her imminent danger 
allegation based on burns and bruises that she says she 
sustained at the hands of prison personnel is based on a single 
past incident, and therefore does not suggest a threat of future 
harm.  Cf. Abdul-Akbar, 239 F.3d at 315 n.1 (concluding that 
a single alleged past assault with pepper spray did not 
constitute imminent danger).  Also, her allegation that her 
injuries from that incident went untreated is not supported by 
the record.  Her allegations relating to her failing eyesight and 
osteoarthritis represent disagreements about the quality of the 
medical care that she is receiving which, even if true, are not 
sufficient to support an imminent danger claim.  See Brown v. 
Beard, 492 F. Supp. 2d 474, 478 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (rejecting 
imminent danger claim when prisoner “does not dispute that 
he is receiving medical attention, but merely disputes the 
findings and quality of the treatment he is receiving”).  
Moreover, even if poor care for her past injuries, her eyesight, 
or her arthritis may prove detrimental to Ball’s health over 
time, they do not represent “imminent dangers” which are 
“about to occur at any moment or are impending.”  Abdul-
Akbar, 239 F.3d at 315. 
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Ball’s allegation of imminent danger based on having 
been sprayed with mace is contradicted by the record, see 
Ball v. Buckley, No. 11-cv-1829 (M.D. Pa.) (Doc. 81) (noting 
that Dr. Famiglio had cleared her for the use of mace, given 
her history of assaultive behavior, after balancing her mild 
asthma with safety and security needs),
30
 but her allegation of 
imminent danger due to mold in her cell is similar to one that 
we have found sufficient to invoke the exception.  In Gibbs, 
supra, a prisoner alleged that he was forced to breathe 
particles of lint and dust that were dispersed into his cell 
through the ventilation system.  The prisoner claimed to have 
been suffering from “severe headaches, changes in voice, 
mucus that is full of dust and lint, and watery eyes,” and that, 
“depending on the nature of the particles that he is breathing, 
there is a significant possibility that he is under imminent 
danger of serious physical injury.”  Gibbs, 160 F.3d at 965 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  We rejected the 
                                              
30
 Ball’s mace-based allegation of imminent danger is 
also similar to one that we rejected in Abdul-Akbar v. 
McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307 (3d Cir. 2001).  Ball’s allegation 
appears to be based on a single incident in August 2011 that 
is the subject of another of Ball’s lawsuits, in which prison 
officials used mace to secure her after she refused to answer 
direct orders or to uncover the door to her cell when 
medications were offered.  See Ball v. Buckley, No. 11-cv-
1829 (M.D. Pa.) (Doc. 82).  As such, it is insufficient to 
support a claim of imminent danger.  See Abdul-Akbar, 238 
F.3d at 315 n.1 (concluding that a single alleged incident in 
which the prisoner was sprayed with pepper spray does not 
“suffice to establish ... an ongoing danger” at the time an 
appeal was filed).   
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defendant’s argument that the prisoner’s allegations were 
merely speculative, and concluded that they were sufficient 
for him to claim the benefit of the exception to the PLRA’s 
three strikes rule.  See id. (“Inmates ought to be able to 
complain about unsafe, life-threatening condition[s] in their 
prison without waiting for something to happen to them.” 
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 
Gibbs, however, is distinguishable.  The defendant in 
that case did not contradict the prisoner’s allegations as to the 
air quality in his cell or the nature of his symptoms, but rather 
“attempt[ed] to minimize such allegations by emphasizing 
their speculative nature.”  Id.  We held that, “under our liberal 
pleading rules,” a district court must “credit[] those 
allegations of ‘imminent danger’ that have gone 
unchallenged.”31  Id. at 966.   In this case, Dr. Famiglio 
testified that Ball is not exposed to mold or other 
“environmental elements” and “has not had a reported or 
witnessed asthma attack since her incarceration several years 
ago.”  (App. at 106.)  The record also suggests that any 
breathing problems that Ball suffered at the time she filed this 
appeal may have been due to a fecal bacterial lung infection 
(for which she was treated) that was caused by her smearing 
herself with her own feces.  Those facts tend to refute Ball’s 
mold-based imminent danger allegation.  Cf. Polanco v. 
Hopkins, 510 F.3d 152, 155 (2d Cir. 2007) (concluding that 
prisoner’s allegations that he had been exposed to mold in a 
shower “cannot support a determination that he was in 
                                              
31
 How Gibbs may be affected by the stricter pleading 
standards instituted by the Supreme Court’s decision in Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2006), is not a 
question we need to address today. 
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imminent danger of serious physical injury” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 
The conflicting statements regarding Ball’s mold-
related imminent danger allegation raise the question of 
whether remand is warranted.  As we noted in Gibbs, 
§ 1915(g) “will often times necessitate further factfinding 
proceedings once the imminent danger allegation is 
challenged[,] a byproduct of the PLRA most likely not 
contemplated by Congress, but which must nonetheless be 
handled by the courts.”  160 F.3d at 967 n.8.  The Supreme 
Court has cautioned that “the in forma pauperis statute ... 
accords judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based 
on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual 
power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations 
and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are 
clearly baseless,” such as “claims describing fantastic or 
delusional scenarios ... .”  Denton, 504 U.S. at 32 (quoting 
Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Thus, neither Gibbs nor our other precedents 
require us to “accept as having an arguable basis in fact all 
allegations that cannot be rebutted by judicially noticeable 
facts,” id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), or 
prevent us from “discrediting factual claims of imminent 
danger that are clearly baseless … .”  Gibbs, 160 F.3d at 967 
(internal quotation marks omitted).
32
 
                                              
32
 The Supreme Court’s holding that a court may 
dismiss a prisoner’s claim if the allegations are “fanciful, 
fantastic, [or] delusional,” Denton, 504 U.S. at 32-33 (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted) was limited to the 
dismissal of claims as frivolous.  But we think that the 
underlying reasoning, based on the purpose of the PLRA to 
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Those principles allow us to consider the credibility of 
Ball’s mold-related allegations in the context of all of the 
facts of this case to determine whether a remand on the 
question of imminent danger is necessary.  See Taylor v. 
Watkins, 623 F.3d 483, 485 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[W]hen a 
defendant contests a plaintiff’s claims of imminent danger, a 
court must act to resolve the conflict.  A contrary conclusion 
would mean that a three-strikes plaintiff could proceed IFP 
whenever his allegations of imminent danger were facially 
plausible ... .”); White, 157 F.3d at 1232 (concluding that the 
defendant “has failed to raise a credible allegation that he is in 
imminent danger of serious physical harm, and, therefore, he 
does not come under the exception to § 1915(g)”).  That 
approach is particularly appropriate in this case because it has 
proceeded through discovery and was disposed of on 
defendants’ motions for summary judgment.  See Denton, 504 
U.S. at 33 (noting that a prisoner’s “improbable allegations 
might be properly disposed of on summary judgment” and 
after “factual development”). 
 
Based on the record before us, we conclude that Ball’s 
mold-related allegations are not sufficiently credible to 
warrant remand.  Her medical records and the testimony of 
Dr. Famiglio cast serious doubt on whether she had actually 
been exposed to mold at the time she filed this appeal and, 
even if she had been, whether it had the effect she alleges, 
given that she suffered from “no current [medical] conditions 
requiring regular monitoring let alone treatment.”  (App. at 
                                                                                                     
reduce frivolous prisoner litigation, applies equally to factual 
allegations of imminent danger that would permit a prisoner 
to avoid the application of the PLRA’s three strikes provision.  
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89.)  Moreover, by her own admission, Ball “see[s] and 
hear[s] things not there,” and “can’t think clearly.”  
(Magistrate’s Judge’s Report at 1 (quoting Ball v. Beard, No. 
09-cv-0845 (M.D. Pa.) (Doc. 42, pp. 6-7)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).)  Ball’s admitted “cognitive problems and 
disorders,” id., make her claims of exposure to mold and 
resulting asthma attacks less believable than they might 
otherwise be.
33
  Lastly, Ball has provided no evidence to 
support her mold-related allegations – or any of her other 
physical injury allegations – in either of her motions 
regarding imminent danger.  Because a prisoner claiming that 
she is in imminent danger of serious physical harm must 
“make specific [and] credible allegations to that effect,” 
Childs v. Miller, 713 F.3d 1262, 1267 (10th Cir. 2013) 
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted), and 
Ball has failed to do so, the imminent danger exception does 
not apply, and her three PLRA strikes bar her from IFP status 
for purposes of these appeals. 
 
                                              
33
 We are not implying that prisoners with delusions 
are to have their allegations disregarded for that reason alone.  
While an admittedly delusional plaintiff may face credibility 
challenges based on the existence of his or her delusions, the 
record ought otherwise provide some support for a negative 
determination on credibility before the court entirely 
discounts the claim of imminent danger.  We also do not 
suggest that a credibility determination may be based on a 
prisoner’s prior litigation history alone.  See Gibbs, 160 F.3d 
at 966 (“Congress [in enacting § 1915(g)] was clearly 
concerned with continuing to afford in forma pauperis filing 
status to inmates who had a history suggestive of abusing the 
judicial system.”).   
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III. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny Ball’s request 
to proceed IFP on these appeals.  Unless she pays the 
docketing fee within 14 days of the judgment rendered 
herewith, these appeals will be dismissed pursuant to Third 
Circuit L.A.R. 107.1(a).  Ball’s motion for appointment of 
counsel will be denied without prejudice. 
